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A B S T R A C T
Basic anthropological terminologyi is the first project covering terms from the domain of the social sciences under the
Croatian Special Field Terminology program (Strunaii). Problems that have been sporadically noticed or whose existence
could have been presumed during the processing of terms mainly from technical fields and sciences have finally emerged
in »anthropology«. The principles of the General Theory of Terminology (GTT), which are followed in Struna, were put
to a truly exacting test, and sometimes stretched beyond their limits when applied to concepts that do not necessarily have
references in the physical world; namely, abstract and metaphysical conceptsiii. We are currently developing a new termi-
nographical model based on Idealized Cognitive Models (ICM), which will hopefully ensure a better cross-filed imple-
mentation of various types of concepts and their relations. The goal of this paper is to introduce the theoretical bases of
our model. Additionally, we will present a pilot study of the series of experiments in which we are trying to investigate the
nature of conceptual categorization in special languages and its proposed difference form categorization in general lan-
guage.
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Traditional Terminology and Objectivity
The General Theory of Terminology (GTT)1, which
can today be referred to as »traditional terminology«, as-
sumes objectivity in defining conceptsiv. Throughout our
terminographical work in Struna, we have found numer-
ous cases on the bases of which we can safely say that hu-
man categorization is mostly subjective. Traditional ter-
minology is based on objective epistemology, which sees
the human mind as an abstract machine for manipulat-
ing symbols, and sees thought as a mechanical manipula-
tion of those symbols, and, finally, sees symbols as an in-
ner representation of the world2. The problem with this
approach is not in the way how mind, thought or symbol
are defined, but in what this implies. The first implica-
tion is that objective categorization exists beyond human
influence, and that all one can do is to mechanically
mimic categories in constructing one’s own categoriza-
tion. The second is that a concept either belongs to a cer-
tain category or not, without any middle ground. With
the development of cognitive linguistics, this objective
epistemology was discredited by Roach3,4, and later in
the works of G. Lakoff and M. Johnson2,5,6 and many oth-
ers.
Unfortunately, GTT, although a part of applied lin-
guistics, has never updated its foundations and still in-
sists that concepts must fit into an objective categoriza-
tion. GTT’s ideal definition is in the form of a genus
proximum et differentia specifica, which in practice takes
the form of hypernym + characteristic that distinguishes
it from other concepts on the same level. The idea is that
defining all concepts in this manner will result in a




iii Such as culture, magic, and sometimes space (we will elaborate this one later in paper).
iv For the purposes of this paper we include both concepts and categories into our definition of concepts.
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polygon = flat shape consisting of straight lines joined
to form a closed chain or circuit
triangle = polygon with three sides
isosceles triangle = triangle with two sides that are
equal in length
This works quite well on exact concepts, as we have
shown above. The reason for this is that universal con-
cepts emerge from objects or items that exist in realia,
the existence of which does not depend on the human
mind. Humans can call a triangle whatever they like and
imagine it in all types and colors, and it will always re-
main a »flat shape consisting of three straight lines
joined to form a closed chain«.
Problems arise when one tries to apply this formula to
a concept that is not as exact as a triangle. The concept of
culture is one of the key concepts in anthropologyv.
Therefore, a proper definition of culture is crucial to a
systematic processing of the special language of anthro-
pology. Although culture is a key concept, it is not a
top-level category that does not have a superordinate cat-
egory (hypernym). But what is its hypernym? There are
probably as many definitions of culture as there are dic-
tionaries in the worldvi. Since dictionaries are (usually)
written by experts, we must assume that all of them are
correct, and they probably are. The mere fact that there
are so many definitions of the same concept should lead
us to the conclusion that there is no such thing as an ob-
jective (in a sense of universally appropriate) categoriza-
tion for some concepts. Even if we were to arbitrarily
choose a category that contains culture as its subordi-
nate (hyponym), and many have tried12,
cumulative deposit of; the systems; communication;
cultivated behavior, totality of a person’s; way of life
of a group of people; symbolic communication; con-
sists of patterns; the sum of total of the learned be-
havior of a group of people; collective program of the
mind…
this still does not solve any of the problems. Firstly, we
are as far from objective categorization as we were be-
fore, and secondly, this kind of arbitrarily chosen cate-
gory will most certainly generate problems in the future.
Let us say that we have chosen, to the best of our abili-
ties, a definition of culture with one of these hypernymic
concepts, as we have done for anthropology:
the totality of the conceptual, functional and material
organization of lifestyle that serves as a means of
adaption to the environment and ensures the survival
of the individual and the communityvii
(sveukupnost idejne, djelatne i materijalne organi-
zacije na~ina `ivota koja slu`i kao sredstvo prilagodbe
okolini i osiguranja opstanka pojedinca i zajednice).
Struna is an ever-growing national terminological da-
tabase, which will eventually include most if not all Cro-
atian terminology. Therefore we must assume that in the
near future, a new field of knowledge (or special lan-
guage), in which culture will be a part of the conceptual
system, will be included. The definition of culture as pro-
posed by anthropology will almost certainlyviii not be
ideal for that special language. Therefore a new defini-
tion of culture will be included. The problem of multiple
entries of the »same« concept rarely occurs in single field
terminologies; in multidisciplinary terminological data-
bases multiple entries are fairly common and the source
of many problems. The problem of harmonization of
multiple entries in Struna was reported by Runjaji} and
Bergovec13. And, although several methods were applied,
no satisfactory solution was found for this problem. We
believe that the terminografical model based on GTT
principles is not equipped with necessary tools for opti-
mal description of conceptual variations that emerge
from various special languages, especially in multidisci-
plinary term-bases. Human categorization is not an ob-
jective or universal process, but inevitably emerges from
social/cultural experience2,14–16. We believe that this di-
mension must be incorporated in terminology, both in
theory and in praxis.
Modern Terminology
The General Theory of Terminology has existed as an
unquestioned theory for almost 30 years. It all started
with Eugine Wüster17, an engineer with a great interest
in information science, who laid the foundations for what
was to later become the General Theory of Terminology.
In the last two decades, the principles of terminology de-
veloped by Wüster have been questioned and critiqued by
many authors18–23. The main criticism is: the principles
of GTT are not flexible enough to account for all the spe-
cific semantic aspects of a sign in language for special
purposes (LSP). We must agree with this criticism. An
explanation as to why this critique is valid can be traced
to a combination of two factors that influenced Wüsters
work; as an engineer, his main concern was the standard-
ization of technical terms, and the approach to linguis-
tics that prevailed in his time was structuralism24. This
resulted in a formal approach to terminology that can be
used optimally for exact (technical) conceptsix, but is
lacking in the adaptability needed for concepts of a more
abstract nature.
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v Culture is mentioned in almost 300 terms or definitions in Basic anthropological terminology.
vi All Croatian dictionaries consulted for the purpose of this paper had a similar but slightly different definition of culture7–12.
vii All of the definitions were originally written in Croatian and translated (to the best of our abilities) to English for the purposes of this paper.
An original definition in Croatian is always marked in italic in text or as an endnote as a way of fact checking.
viii This statement is based on our experience with previous projects, where different definitions even for technical concepts such as anode were proposed
by various projects.
ix Although even that statement is far too strong, as we have experienced in our work on Struna and as reported in literature25.
The critique of GTT comes from (roughly) three main
sides: cognitive science, language science, and communi-
cation sciencex. Most of the arguments are valid and
point out, from various approaches, the problems and
unsustainability of GTT.
A promising idea can be found in the early works of
Rita Temmerman25,26. Temmerman suggested that the
socio-cognitive approach to terminology could possibly
solve most, if not all, of the problems emerging from
GTT. The main argument stated is that, to explain (de-
fine) a concept, one must first fully understand it. Since
concepts are not formed independently from human cog-
nition but as a result of it, this must be done not by at-
tempting to be objective, but by taking into account all of
the socio-cognitive parameters crucial to the formation
of human categorization. Unfortunately, as good as this
idea may be, this theory has yet to be put into practice. In
her latest work27,28, Temmerman diverges first into an
ontological approach,xi and finally into the development
of knowledge bases. Although we do believe that both are
useful and are valid paths to be taken, the result is a step
too close to an encyclopedic representation of knowledge
to be considered terminological term base such as Struna.
The second main approach to alternative terminologi-
cal theory that will be mentioned here is that of M.
Teresa Cabré Castellví. She argues that the subject of
terminology, rather than being viewed as a concept as it
is in GTT, should be seen as a »unit of knowledge«18,
showing its polyhedral nature through three compo-
nents: linguistic (as part of a language – LSP), cognitive
(knowledge component), and social, which would include
both communicational and socio-cultural elements. This
is a valid point and has been widely accepted, even by
some Wüsterians. In its essence, Cabré’s suggested ap-
proach does not differ significantly from the early works
of Temmerman. Her main concern, however, is to estab-
lish terminology as a valid modern scientific discipline,
not to solve »field work« problems; the idea being that
one has to have a working theory in order to develop
functional methods. This being said, we are not sure if
»theory – practice« is a better path than »practice – the-
ory – practice – revised theory«. We believe that human
categorization is far too complex to theoretically cover all
possible »types« of concepts in all of their variations. We
fear that, if we develop a »new« General Theory simply
through theoretical thinking, in thirty years we may find
ourselves in a similar »crisis«; a situation where termi-
nology cannot encompass all of its subjects.
The most promising, and certainly the most devel-
oped approach to terminology is the Frame-based termi-
nology proposed by P. Faber29,30. The aim of this approach
to terminology, as the author herself claims (2001: 194),
is to establish the basis for a complete terminographic
description and presentation that will cover linguistic
and nonlinguistic related relations in a given domain,
but also the relationships with other domains. Faber and
colleagues point out that the description of the concep-
tual structure of the specialized domains is a necessary
aspect of terminology management. The way in which
the concept is presented affects the form of the informa-
tion in each processed terminological unit, as well as in
any data field that contains information about the con-
cept, especially the individual description of the concept
or the definition31. Based on these principles, they con-
clude that conceptual representations should not be me-
rely a hierarchical list of objects presented by simple or
complex noun constructions, and therefore, propose dy-
namic organization of the conceptual system of terminol-
ogy. Relying largely on the frame semantics32, they are
proposing a model which places concepts of a particular
domain into a prototypical situation or frame for basic
processes that occur in a specialized domain. In this
model, concepts are organized around the interface which
is defined trough events that are described by agent, pro-
cess and patient templates.
Actions and events that are repeated form the basis of
the conceptual structure of events. Faber and colleagues
approach terminology based on the development of ge-
neric template which is used to process information at all
levels of the structure. Starting from the premise that
the description of the specialized domain is based on
events that are taking place in that domain, they con-
clude that concepts are best described in terms of these
events. Every domain of knowledge is given a template,
which allows it to form a framework for the organization
of specific concepts. Specific concepts in each category
are organized in a network where they are connected
through both hierarchical and non-hierarchical relation-
ships.
Cognitive linguistic-based terminology proposed by
Faber and colleagues has certainly set a sort of template
for a modern approach to terminology. On the basis of
linguistic theory and modified models for lexicographical
description, they have produced a functional model for
practical terminographical praxis.
The Special Language of Anthropology
As we have stated before, anthropology is the first
language for special purposes from the domain of the so-
cial sciences that we have described in Struna. Up until
then, most of the terminological units we encountered
included concepts that were universal and exact in the
sense that they designated physical objects or events in
real world. Despite that, we have had problems when two
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x We will not delve too deeply into the genealogy of modern terminological theories, nor into the history of Wüsterian terminology, as this would lead us
beyond the main argument of this paper. Furthermore, enough papers have been written on this subject, and it would not be possible to outstrip them in
quality. Limitations of space should also be borne in mind. For a detailed revision of terminological theories, the works of M. Teresa Cabré Castellví and
Rita Temmerman are highly recommended26,42.
xi Termontography.
(or more) experts from different fields insisted on a dif-
ferent definition for what seemed like the same concept.
The example already reported13 is anode, which even af-
ter harmonization still has four terminological units
with various definitions:
physics: electrode with the greater electrical potential
engineering: positive electrode in electrolytic cell
chemistry: negative charged electrode
chemical engineering: electrode with predominately
anode reaction.
It is obvious that experts from different fields see
»identical« concepts with a semantic shift clearly condi-
tioned by their field of expertise. This shift can be ob-
served on two levels: between two or more languages for
special purposes, and between an individual language for
special purpose and the general language. It is reason-
able to assume that problems of conceptual variations
sporadically emerging in special languages of natural sci-
ences and technical fields will exponentially grow as
more social sciences and humanities are included in our
term-base.
In anticipation of this growing problem, we are trying
to develop a model that could deal with this, and possibly
other, problemsxii caused by following rigid principles of
the GTT. Considering our modest funds and limited re-
sources, an important requirement that we were forced
to impose on ourselves and our model is that it must be
easily incorporated in the existing conceptual structure
described in Struna without excessive changes both in
the database schema and in already processed data.
We have started our investigation with the general
hypothesis that categorization in languages for special
purposes is different than general categorization. In other
words, we felt that categorization that can be observed in
concepts used in special communication does not neces-
sary reflect categorization one uses in everyday commu-
nication trough general language. We have based this
assumption on two observations. First, an expert’s know-
ledge of a certain concept which is in focus of their inter-
est supersedes the knowledge a person has on concepts
from everyday life. Second, the apparatus with witch ex-
pert knowledge is accumulated differs from the way peo-
ple accumulate their knowledge of the world that sur-
rounds them33. For example, let us look at the concept of
internal combustion engine and compare the knowledge
an engineer has on that concept and ourxiii knowledge,
and the way we have accumulated that knowledge. An
engineer presumably knows all there is to know about in-
ternal combustion engines: how they work, what are
their key components, what physical conditions such as
pressure, fuel to air ratio etc. must be met for the engine
to work properly... Perhaps more importantly, the expert
has learned all that intentionally, with the purpose of ac-
cumulating as much information as possible or necessary
for their education or career. We, on the other hand, have
just rudimental knowledge: an engine needs fuel to work,
there are two types based on the fuel they use, and if it
stops working, we have to take it to service. Contrary to
the engineer’s way of learning, we have acquired what
we know spontaneously, among other everyday knowl-
edge.
In the Introduction to Cognitive Sociolinguistic34,
Kristiansen and Driven state: »A usage-based linguistics
takes language as it is actually used by real speakers in
real situations in a specific historical moment as the ba-
sis of its enquiry. As a logical consequence of this fact,
Cognitive Linguistics needs to employ empirical methods
capable of dealing in adequate ways with social variation:
methods that conform to the traditionally high standards
of socio- linguistic research and which are capable of dis-
tinguishing between social and conceptual types of vari-
ability.« It is not hard to recognize that we can (and prob-
ably should) replace Cognitive Linguistic with Termino-
logy to create the optimal basis for LSP research. If we
look at special language as a variation of general (stan-
dard) language, and consider experts as a social subgroup
defined by their common, motivated domain of knowl-
edge and active usage of that special language, it is obvi-
ous that cognitive sociolinguistics could provide a valid
framework for this research. Unfortunately, it is hard to
find many (if any) examples of cognitive (socio) linguis-
tics research with language for special purposes in their
focus. Nevertheless, there are studies on some of the as-
pects that we have recognized as potentially differential:
influence of prior knowledge on categorization35–37, the
effects of context on the structure of categories38, and
dissociation of explicit and implicit category learning39.
Possibly the most important studies that can be indi-
rectly associated with special language are those that in-
vestigate the differences in the development of categori-
zation and categorical structures in experts and novices
as reported by Murphy and Wright40 and Shafto and
Coley41.xiv
Materials and Methods
As a starting point of our investigation of presumed
differentia of cognitive categorizations, we have conduc-
ted a pilot study that will (hopefully) provide foundation
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xii Since our investigation is still in the early stages it would be inappropriate to claim that all of the problems of the GTT could or will be solved, but we
believe that some, like usage of metaphor, could easily be incorporated in the proposed model.
xiii By ourselves we mean the authors of this paper.
xiv Space does not permit a systematic summary and critique of every study; therefore, we will mention just a few. As we have mentioned before, we have
set a more modest goal for ourselves: to introduce the theoretical bases of a model that is still in the early stages of development, and to report on a pilot
experiment. Papers mentioned in this paragraph have inspired us to try to contribute in a small way. Systematic summary of all of the studies that could
contribute to further understanding of all of the aspects of human categorization that could be associated with special language deserve at least an inde-
pendent paper.
for later studies. We have first examined how experts in
physics and anthropology and »laymen« generate mem-
bers of three categories. To compare experts from differ-
ent fields of knowledge and non-experts, we have tried to
select two categories that are basic concepts in two fields
of knowledge but are at the same time relatively common
in general language. The terms from expert fields were:
space (prostor) for physics and symbol (simbol) for an-
thropology. Furthermore, we have tried to select the
terms which, even though perceived as specific to one of
the fields, are not unknown or unused in the other
fieldsxv. Finally, we selected one word from general lan-
guage as a contrast categoryxvi. The contrast category
was presented by automobile (car).
The sample included two expert groups and one con-
trast group with 20 subjects each. Expert groups con-
sisted of PhD students and D. Scs. from the fields of phy-
sics (Phy) and anthropology (Ant). The contrast group
(Con) included university graduates with mayors in fields
that are not (typically) related to physics and anthropo-
logyxvii. Participation was entirely voluntary and subjects
did not receive any compensation for participation.
As mentioned, categories presented by two terms
from Struna and one word from general language were
used as stimuli in a members generation task. Categories
were printed one per page in a booklet that included an
additional page with instructions and an example. The
instructions informed the subjects that the goal of the
study was to find out how people think about random
things. They would be given a number of categories, and
they would have to write as many members of that cate-
gory as they can think of. The example of a category dog
was given, with various members listed as valid: German
Shepard, Golden Retriever, small dog, big dog, fast dog…
No time limit was given, but subject were not allowed to
go back to previous category once they started a new one.
Results
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) on frequencies showed
statistically significant differences for space F(2.56)=
10.79 with p£0.001, and for symbol F(2.56)=7.18 with
p=0.002. There was no significant difference for car p=
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xv Although one can question any selection we have made, our selection was made after intensive »text« analysis of processed terms form projects of physics
and anthropology in Struna. The selection was made after identifying terms that could potentially be used in a somewhat different meaning in these fields.
xvi The main (and only) requirement for the selection of the general language category was that it does not appear in the term list or in definitions of any
terms in physics and anthropology.
xvii Professions encompassed in Con group were economics (N=10), law (p=4), computer science (N=2), dental medicine (N=1) and criminology (N1).
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Percentages and totals are based on responses.
a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.
b. N-space was used as code for all answers that referred to multidimensional space.
c. Vacuum was used as code for all answers that referred to empty space.
d. Spacetime was used as code for all answers that referred to four-dimensional space.
e. Answers in Croatian were: vektorski prostor, n-prostor, euklidski prostor, vakuum, otvoreni prostor, fazni prostor, prostor-vrijeme,
soba, zatvoreni prostor, dodirno podru~je.
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TABLE 2





















Group Phy Count 12 3 0 6 0 0 10 0 0 3 34
% within G 35.3% 8.8% 0.0% 17.6% 0.0% 0.0% 29.4% 0.0% 0.0% 8.8%
% within 0 57.1% 21.4% 0.0% 31.6% 0.0% 0.0% 76.9% 0.0% 0.0% 19.0%
% of Total 8.7% 2.2% 0.0% 4.3% 0.0% 0.0% 7.2% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 25%
Group Ant Count 6 6 13 6 13 12 2 10 5 8 81
% within G 7.4% 7.4% 16.0% 7.4% 16.0% 14.8% 2.5% 12.3% 6.2% 9.9%
% within Q 28.6% 42.9% 92.9% 31.6% 100.0% 100.0% 15.4% 100.0% 83.3% 50.0%
% of Total 4.3% 4.3% 9.4% 4.3% 9.4% 8.7% 1.4% 7.2% 3.6% 5.8% 59%
Group Con Count 3 5 1 7 0 0 1 0 1 5 23
% within G 13.0% 21.7% 4.3% 30.4% 0.0% 0.0% 4.3% 0.0% 4.3% 22.0%
% within Q 14.3% 35.7% 7.1% 36.8% 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 0.0% 16.7% 31.0%
% of Total 2.2% 3.6% 0.7% 5.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0,7% 3.6% 17%
Total Count 21 14 14 19 13 12 13 10 6 16 138
% of Total 15.2% 10.1% 10.1% 13.8% 9.4% 8.7% 9.4% 7.2% 4.3% 12% 100%
Percentages and totals are based on responses.
a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.
b. Answers in Croatian were: kemijski simbol, kri`, simbol mo}i, slovo, simbol plodnosti, simbol `ivota, matemati~ki simbol, simbol
smrti, statusni simbol, znak.
TABLE 3

















Group Phy Count 12 7 8 7 3 4 4 2 3 3 53
% within G 22.6% 13.0% 15.1% 13.0% 5.7% 7.5% 7.5% 3.8% 6.0% 5.7%
% within Q 30.0% 44.0% 61.5% 47.0% 33.0% 33.3% 80.0% 20.0% 27.0% 33.3%
% of Total 8.6% 5.0% 5.7% 5.0% 2.1% 2.9% 2.9% 1.4% 2.0% 2.1% 38%
Group Ant Count 14 4 1 3 6 2 0 5 5 2 42
% within G 33.3% 9.5% 2.4% 7.1% 14.0% 4.8% 0.0% 12.0% 12.0% 4.8%
% within Q 35.0% 25.0% 7.7% 20.0% 67.0% 16.7% 0.0% 50.0% 45.0% 22.2%
% of Total 10.0% 2.9% 0.7% 2.1% 4.3% 1.4% 0.0% 3.6% 4.0% 1.4% 30%
Group Con Count 14 5 4 5 0 6 1 3 3 4 45
% within G 31.1% 11.0% 8.9% 11.0% 0.0% 13.3% 2.2% 6.7% 7.0% 8.9%
% within Q 35.0% 31.0% 30.8% 33.0% 0.0% 50.0% 20.0% 30.0% 27.0% 44.4%
% of Total 10.0% 3.6% 2.9% 3.6% 0.0% 4.3% 0.7% 2.1% 2.0% 2.9% 32%
Total Count 40 16 13 15 9 12 5 10 11 9 140
% of Total 28.6% 11% 9.3% 11% 6.4% 8.6% 3.6% 7.1% 8% 6.4% 100%
Percentages and totals are based on responses
a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.
b. Manu was used as code for all answers referring to individual manufactures in car industry.
c. Answers in Croatian were: proizvo|a~, osobni automobil, dvosjed, sportski auto, Fi}o, kabriolet, gradski auto, limuzina, terenac,
karavan.
0.105. Post hoc test of multiple comparisons (Games-
-Howell) revealed between which groups the difference
was located.
space: PhyJ : ConI (3.11, 95% CI [2.96, 10.14])
p£0.001; AntJ : ConI (3.44, 95% CI [0.56, 6.32])
p=0.016,
symbol: AntJ : ConI (6.44, 95% CI [3.25, 9.62])
p£0.001.
For further analysis, we have taken 10 generated
members of each category. We have tried to avoid that
most (if not all) selected members coming from answers
given by the expert group of the field that category
prototypically belongs toxviii. Therefore, 10 most frequen-
tly generated members for each group were taken, ran-
ked form 1–10, with 10 being the most frequent. In the
next step of selection, we have combined the generated
members in a new list and added together their »ranks«.
From that combined list, 10 members with the higher
sum of ranks were selected.
Crosstabulation of multiple answers reveals percent-
ages differences of given answers between groups. For
the sake of clarity, the results are given in tables (Tables
1, 2 and 3).
Discussion
Although too few categories were covered in this pilot
study to consider it pertinent for the proposed hypothe-
sis, we believe that differences observed could serve as a
justification for further investigations. Analysis did show
certain statistically significant differences both in the
variance of frequencies and in the dispersion of gener-
ated members between groups. One-way ANOVA expec-
tedly showed no significant differences for the category
car. Since car is not a dominant concept in special lan-
guages of physics or anthropology, we did not expect to
find differences between experts and non-experts in tho-
se languages. Significant differences observed for space
and symbol, as revealed by post-hoc test, were located
mainly between experts in the field that term belongs to
and the contrast group; namely, between Ant and Con for
symbol and between Psy and Con for space. There was
also a significant difference between Ant and Con for
space, although a slightly smaller one. We were expecting
more significant differences between Psy and Ant groups
for both terms. Although analysis did not meet our ex-
pectations, these results do not necessarily disapprove
our presumption. A plausible explanation could be that
experts from both groups simply know more members of
the presented categories than the subjects from the con-
trast group, although not necessarily the same ones.
Crosstabulation does support this explanation. If we
compare members of the symbol category that half or
more subjects from Ant group generated (C³10), it can be
noted that percentages within category (%WQ) are over
90%. Specifically, symbol of power (C=13, %WQ 92.9),
symbol of fertility (C=13, %WQ 100), symbol of life (C=
12, %WQ 100) and symbol of death (C=10, %WQ 100).
Similar effects can be observed for space: vector space
(C=18), n-space (C=17), Euclidean space (C=10), phase
space (C=11) and space-time (C=12) are all within cate-
gory percentage 100. The sole exception is vacuum (C=
12, %WQ 70).xix Furthermore, both chemical and mathe-
matical symbols did get the highest counts and percent-
ages in the Psy group. Similarly, contact zone for cate-
gory space in the Ant group has a relatively low count (6)
but does have 100% within the category.
These results do imply a certain difference between
how experts of a certain field of knowledge categorize
concepts that are motivated, and how non-experts of that
field categorize them. We believe that results from this
pilot study do justify further investigation. Naturally, fu-
ture studies should in the first place include more catego-
ries; furthermore, in selecting stimuli, more thought
should be invested into profiling categories. Namely, sep-
arating potentially shared categories from those that are
in use exclusively in a particular LSP. Category genera-
tion does seems like a logical choice for the next step, and
further in the future, probably, studies that include
members/category rating and grouping concepts in se-
mantic contexts or »spaces« should be designed.
Model
As we have mentioned in the introduction, the model
for describing variations in categorizations between dif-
ferent languages for special purposes that we are devel-
oping for the most parts relies on Idealized Cognitive
Models as described by G. Lakoff2. In our work in Struna
we have numerous cases where experts from different
fields perceive the »same« concept in a slightly or com-
pletely different way. The previously mentioned case of
anode is just one of many. We believe that those differ-
ences reflect field-specific categorization that is rela-
tively stable within the group consisting of experts with
same motivated domain of knowledgexx. Furthermore, as
results of our experiment are possibly implying, a specific
definition of a concept entails different definitions of
other concepts for certain groups. Even in a small scale
experiment as one presented here, it is evident that dif-
ferent groups of experts usually generate different mem-
bers of the category. For instance, the category symbol
stimulated the Psy group to generate symbols that are
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xviii We have observed that if we used total frequencies as the rule for selecting the answers for category space and symbol, most answers would come from
Phy and Ant groups respectively.
xix This could be the result of less than optimal coding. Videlicet we have coded all »empty spaces« and vacuums as vacuum. In the light of this result, the
question we have to ask ourselves is: is e.g. a lawyer’s empty space the same concept as a physicist’s empty space or vacuum.
xx By motivated domain we consider any domain of knowledge in which a person has great motivation for learning. This could include, beside common
reasons such as higher education or professional specialization, personal hobbies or interests.
universally accepted and defined: chemical and mathe-
matical symbols. The Ant group, on the other hand, ini-
tially generated symbols the definitions of which are
more dependent on socio-cultural environment. Death,
life, fertility and status are all concepts that vary in defi-
nitions both spatially and historically. Idealized Cogni-
tive Models optimally (for our purposes) explain and en-
compass this kind of categorical variations. Thus, ICMs
could be perceived as an inter-sphere for a semantic envi-
ronment in which certain concepts form relatively stable
relations and are categorized slightly differently than
»same« concepts in other ICMs.
Example and implementation
As an example we decided to use space. Space is a con-
cept that initially encouraged us to think about alternate
ways of describing conceptual systems in our term-base.
In 2010/11, when we were working on terms from the
field of physics, we encountered a logical problem with
concepts of space (3D) and n-dimensional space (ND). In-
tuitively, we know that any space that has more than 3
dimensions is a special case of »normal« 3D space. How-
ever, if we look at the definitions proposed by physicists,
our intuition is disapproved.
a. space (3D): infinite three-dimensional extent in which
bodies have relative positions
b. n-dimensional space: infinite n-dimensional extent in
which bodies have relative positionsxxi
When we have to place those two concepts in a hierar-
chical relation, logic demands that 3D space be just one
of the possible members of the n-dimensional space cate-
gory. There are two main problems with this kind of
terminographic intervention:
a. a smaller one; if we define IS-A relation from space to
n-dimensional space, we should use genus proximum
(GP) in definition of space. That would produce a defi-
nition that would not make much sense – n-dimensio-
nal space that has only three dimensions. This can be
bypassed by pretending that that genus proximum et
differentia specifica is more a guideline than a rulexxii.
b. a much bigger problem is that we are describing the
conceptual system of special language of physics incor-
rectly. Experts in the field of physics do not think of
space as a member of n-dimensional space, but vice
versa. This was confirmed in our experiment where
both 4D and ND spaces were generated as members of
space (Table 2). Unfortunately, it wasn’t as easy to fix
this as it had been to fix previously mentioned prob-
lem, and we were forced to leave this artificially cre-
ated relation in our term-base.
There are a number of concepts in anthropology that
refer to the concept of space in their definitions. As far as
we were able to detect, they can be divided into three
groups by versions of spaces:
a. »Normal« (3D) space includes concepts that refer to
certain geographical areas. Such as: culture area (GP
= geographic area); workshop (GP = space in which
…)
b. Space that beside its geographical reference includes a
socio-culturally depended component. Such as: con-
tact zone defined as: a social space where groups of di-
verse cultural traits meet. Where social space is geo-
graphical area but at the same time must be socially
recognized as acceptable for one reason or another.
c. Completely metaphorical space as seen in the defini-
tion of state of exception: space outside of the political
community in which sovereign power excludes from
law those that have been reduced to bare life. Where
space is a metaphor, as it does not represent actual
geographic area but a government enforcement of dif-
ferent rules for undesirable people which puts them
»outside« of desired social groups.
Since the principles of GTT do not provide valid tools
for describing this kind of specific semantic dependen-
cies, end-user’s query for space will produce all of these
termsxxiii as equally relevant. We are hoping that by con-
necting concepts in inter-spheres that are based on ICMs
we would be able to group concepts in layers that would
better represent inter-field and intra field conceptual re-
lations. In the case of space in the special language of an-
thropology, that would mean that tree cognitive models
would be neededxxiv:
a. First one that would refer to »normal« space as defi-
ned in physics and would layer all concepts that refer
to geographical areas.
b. The second one that would, beside a reference to 3D
space include an anthropology-specific component
that refers to more abstract concepts such as society
and culture.
c. The third one that would layer metaphoric spaces.
In physics, the obvious layering would be to classic
and modern physics. Here, the classic layer would in-
clude 3D space as well as Euclidean space, and the mod-
ern layer would include n-dimensional space, space-time
and phase spacexxv. Deeper layering based on specific the-
ories or approaches in physics should be implemented
when possible and/or needed.
Naturally, layers should not be limited to individual
concepts like space, but should include all the concepts
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xxi Definitions in Croatian are: neograni~ena trodimenzijska/n-dimenzijska prote`nost u kojoj tijela imaju relativne polo`aje.
xxii As we did.
xxiii And many more.
xxiv By no means do we claim that only three IMC layers would be needed, or even that maybe two would not be sufficient. This approximation is based on
our observation so far as presented in this paper.
xxv Naturally, this is just a basic generalization based on our modest knowledge of physics. More precise differential layering should be (and hopefully will
be) done in close collaboration with physic experts.
that function in that ICM. For example if a layer »special
relativity« is defined, it should include concepts such as:
space-time, proper time, rest energy, relativistic addition
of velocities, time dilation, twin paradox etc.
Implementation of this kind of description in our
term-base will be far from simple. There are at least two
issues that we will have to address prior to actual devel-
opment of practical solutions. First of all, there is the is-
sue of defining top and bottom layers. As one can imag-
ine, there are possibly unlimited ways to group concepts
into layers: by theories, by branches of the field, by
schools, by subjects of study etc. There is a real possibil-
ity that too many layers would result in exactly the oppo-
site of what we are hoping to achieve: A presentation of
special languages that is next to useless to the end-user.
On the other hand, we should refrain from arbitrarily
choosing the number of layers that should be imple-
mented. No two languages are the same, either in size of
conceptual system or in the »broadness« of it. It is hard
to compare the field of physic with for instance that of
corrosion and protection of materialsxxvi. We believe that
a custom approach to each individual special language
will be necessary. Analysis of particular special language
prior to implementation of layers will have to be manda-
tory. The definition of the top layer will probably require
the implementation of the general language module. We
must assume that if we follow hierarchical relations in
the conceptual system of LSP upwards, we will eventu-
ally come to general language. Therefore, a general lexi-
con should be the logical choice for top level layer.
The second issue that we must mention is that pro-
cess of identifying layers or Idealized Cognitive Models
requires knowledge of the field that far supersedes the
knowledge of an average terminography expertxxvii. The-
refore, close collaboration with field experts will have to
be included in this phase.
Conclusion
It is evident that the principles of GTT are (mostly)
adequate for defining technical and exact concepts when
dealing with individual languages for special purpose.
For multidisciplinary term-banks like Struna, problems
emerging as the result of rigid GTT principles multiply
as more and more special languages are included.
We have presented the results from a pilot experiment
that will be used as a starting point for further investiga-
tion of the nature of the categorization in special lan-
guages.
Although our model is currently just a zygote, we be-
lieve that after further studies we will be able to develop
it to the functional level that will insure enough flexibil-
ity to encompass specific variations both in particular
LSP and between different ones. Technically speaking,
we are hoping that our model will be relatively easily im-
plemented as an overlayer on the existing structure. Im-
plementing such a flexible model for describing categori-
zation variations we would improve the end-users’ expe-
rience and, more importantly, we would achieve a more
accurate representation of conceptual structures of pro-
cessed LSP. That would result in term databases that
could accommodate more contextually-dependent knowl-
edge and would help the end-user to understand what
culture is, as well as why it cannot be and is not defined
in the same way in two or more different languages for
special purposes.
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O PROBLEMIMA U DEFINIRANJU APSTRAKTNIH I METAFIZI^KIH KONCEPATA
– POJAVA NOVOG MODELA
S A @ E T A K
Osnovna antropolo{ka terminologija prvi je projekt koji je obuhvatio nazivlje iz podru~ja dru{tvenih znanosti pod
programom hrvatskoga strukovnog nazivlja (Struna). Problemi koji su bili sporadi~no primije}eni ili ~ije se postojanje
moglo predvidjeti tijekom procesuiranja nazivlja, poglavito iz tehni~kih podru~ja i znanosti, kona~no su se pojavili u
»antropologiji«. Prinicipi op}e teorije terminologije (OTT), koji su bili slije|eni u Struni, stavljeni su na zaista ozbiljan
test i ponekad rastezani preko svojih granica kada su primijenjeni na apstraktne i metafizi~ke koncepte koji nu`no
nemaju reference u fizi~kome svijetu. Trenuta~no razvijamo novi terminolo{ki model zasnovan na idealiziranim kogni-
tivnim modelima (IKM), koji }e, nadamo se, osigurati bolju me|upoljnu primjenu razli~itih koncepata i njihovih od-
nosa. Cilj je ovoga rada prikazati teorijsku osnovu na{ega modela. Dodatno, prezentirat }emo pilot studiju serije ekspe-
rimenata u kojima poku{avamo istra`iti prirodu konceptualne kategorizacije u posebnim jezicima i njihovu predlo`enu
razliku u odnosu na kategorizaciju u op}emu jeziku.
B. Nahod and P. Vuk{a Nahod: Defining Abstract and Metaphysical Concepts, Coll. Antropol. 38 (2014) Suppl. 2: 181–190
190
